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Theoretical concepts of bank competitiveness are studied and research approaches to the banking efficiency 
measurement are overviewed. Empirical models of competition in banking are considered for identifying the key 
factors of bank competitiveness.  
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The development of global financial markets has acted to alter the competitive environment of financial 
institutions (Hirtle, 1991, p.38). Thus internationally active financial institutions (banks) should respond to 
opportunities and challenges of an increasingly competitive global market environment due to increased access 
of foreign competitors to domestic financial markets and the expanding availability of traditional banking 
services from non-traditional sources. In such circumstances the intense competition have changed the nature of 
market for the existing banking products and discovered the new ones where financial institutions should 
compete on national and international level. Furthermore increasing integration of banks into financial markets 
allows banks to shift their traditional risks to the markets which influence on financial system stability in general 
(Boot and Thakor, 2009, p.21). 
The aim of the research is to study the concepts of bank competitiveness and the models of its 
measurement. The research objectives are: 
 to study competitive issues according to bank productivity studies in order define simple production 
function and its efficiency frontiers;  
 to consider the empirical models of banking competition in order to identify major factors of bank 
competitiveness. 
II. COMPETITIVE ISSUES ACCORDING TO BANK PRODUCTIVITY STUDIES 
Competition is a rivalry between individuals of companies which are interested in a reaching its goals. 
From the social welfare point of view perfect competition may not be optimal for all industries. Competition in 
the financial system is limited considering the welfare of the financial system and to avoid large rescue costs,. 
Banks are somewhat more protected than other industries to ensure that their profitability is secured so that they 
have an incentive to take risks (Yakoi-Arai and Yoshino, 2006, p.8).  
That’s why the standard paradigm of perfect competition is not considered appropriate for banking as the 
free entry and exit of banks from the market is not possible. Banking sector is prone to becoming oligopolic 
because of prudential regulation such as licensing and capital requirements. Thus competition in banking has 
some specific features which distinguish it from the competition in other industries: 
 banking is leaned toward oligopoly model  which is more appropriate from the effectiveness point of 
view; 
 the subjects of competition are not only banks, but also other financial and non-financial 
organizations;   
 competitive environment is a variety of economy sectors in which banks could be both a seller or a 
buyer;  
 competition is exercised in different forms: the intense intrasectoral competition connected to the 
diversification of banking products and low intersectoral competition because of absent of non-banking 
competitiveness substitutes of banking products; 
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 intense competition limits ability to use price methods and arises the topicality of quality control. 
 The topic of competition in banking is less straightforward because of the intangible nature of banking 
ranging from non-price features associated with virtually all bank services to the maturity structure of bank 
assets and liabilities (Hefferman, 2005, p.473). The measurement of output of services produced by banks is 
specially problematic because of difficulty to account for its quality. That is why there are two different 
approaches to measure bank output (Heffernan, 2005, pp.474-477; Bikker, 2005, p.115): 
1) The production approach: banks are treated as firms which use capital and labour to produce different 
categories of deposit and loan accounts, its outputs are measured by the number of these accounts or the number 
of transactions per account. According to this bank output is treated as a flow, that is, the amount of output 
produced per unit of time. Total costs are all operating costs (the cost of factor input such as labour and capital) 
used to produce these outputs. But such approach has several problems: how to weight each bank service in the 
computation of output; the method ignores interest costs and inflation rates; data from banks using different 
accounting systems in different countries may not be comparable; 
2) The intermediation approach: banks are not producers of loan and deposit, they are intermediators, its 
outputs are measured by the value of loans and investments. According to this bank output is treated as a stock, 
showing the given amount of output at one point in time. Total costs are all operating costs used to produce these 
outputs plus interest costs.   
 Thereby the intermediation approach because of the fewer data problems is used in most bank 
productivity studies. Such studies introduce banks as rational economic agents (Bikker, 2005, pp.116-120):  
 banks act rationally – operate in such a way that it pursues its own goals in what is the best conceivable, 
optimal way; 
 banks are agents interacting with other agents such as consumers and governments; 
 banks are economic agents – their goals are defined in economic terms. Thus banks try to be productive 
and efficient. 
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Figure 1 – Bank productivity 
 In order to explain productivity and efficiency concept we use a simple production function y=f(x), where 
output y is produced using input x, the production function is twice continuously differentiable. Productivity is 
defined here as a y/x (Fig.1), i.e. the number of outputs produced with a single unit of input. Economies of scale 
are defined as the rate at which output changes as all inputs are varied (if as a result of doubling each of the tree 
factor inputs the bank is able to more than double its loan portfolio). Economies of scope exist if the joint 
production costs of producing two or more outputs are lower than if the products are produces separately. 
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Figure 2 – Bank efficiency 
 Efficiency is defined as productivity – the maximum output for a given level of time – the difference 
between observed and optimal input/output mixes: (y/x)/( y*/x)=y/y*,where y is the vector of outputs 
1y  and 2y  
(Fig.2). Such type of efficiency is referred to X-efficiency that results from the position of bank within the 
feasible production set and relative to the production frontier. X-efficiency can be measured in terms of cost and 
profit (Heffernan, 2005, pp.477-478): 
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Cost X-efficiency: objective of bank to be on 
the frontier, not above it, not possible to be on points 
below the curve 
Profit X-efficiency: objective of bank to move 
the maximum profit point on the profit frontier curve 
Figure 3 – Cost and Profit X-efficiency 
 
Thus profit-maximizing banks will want to be on the efficiency frontier but can go further unless there is 
technological change which moves it downwards. However in markets with some degree of monopoly power 
(due to entry barriers, scale economies or regulation) some banks are located somewhere inside the X-efficiency 
frontier. 
 Cost-minimizing banks will want to be on the efficiency frontier, which they could reach due to scale and 
scope economies that provide measures of the extent to which unit costs could be lowered by offering the total 
volume of production or range of products. Lower X-efficiency means reducing costs through improved 
management or greater employee productivity which moves bank closer to the most efficient way of harnessing 
a given set of resources (Heffernan, 2005, p. 478). 
 Thus we have defined the simple production function of banks and the frontiers of its efficiency. In 
banking it is very important to identify special problems which arise from the equivocation in the production 
function of banks (Bikker, p.121). Such equivocation is the reason of efficiency measurement modelling based 
on cost and/or profit function which could explain the result of banks.  
According to Heffernan, there are two different ways of testing for X-efficiencies (Heffernan, 2005, 
pp.478-482): 
Table 1. Concepts of testing X-efficiencies 
Criterion Non-parametric approach Parametric approach 
Methodology 
   Data envelop analysis – is not based on 
any explicit model of the frontier because 
accounting profit measures are difficult to 
compute. 
   Stochastic frontier approach – uses a 
translog cost function. 
Measuring 
formula 
   Compares observed outputs (Yjp) and 
inputs (Xjp) of several organizations, the 
relatively more efficient bank can be 
compared against the relatively less 
efficient by identifying a ‘best practice’. To 










subject to Ер ≤ 1  for all р, where р presents 
several banks and weights 
i
, 
ju > 0. 
   Thus each bank will have a derived rating 
of E, - a measure of relative efficiency, the 
closer E to 1, the higher the relative 
efficiency. 
   Involves estimating a cost (or profit) 
function for a sector: 
),,,,,( czypqTCTC   (2), 
where TC – variable total costs, q – a vector 
of quantities of variable outputs, p – factor 
inputs, y – other variables (environmental or 
market) which effect output, z – quantities of 
fixed inputs of outputs which effect variable 
costs, μ – error term which can arise because 
the bank fails to react optimally to the vector 
of input prices or from employing too many 
of the input to produce q. 
   Using natural logs (ln) on both sides of the 
equation gives (3): 
cczypqfTC  lnln),,,(ln 
 
   Profit efficiency measures show how close 
a bank is to producing the maximum profit 
possible given input prices, output prices 
and other variable (4): 
  lnln),,,()ln(  zyxqF  where π – 
variable profits, θ – constant to ensure the 
natural log is of positive number, x – vector 
of prices of the variable outputs, μ – 
inefficiency that reduces profits. 
Usage in banking 
Via linear programming model it measures 
the efficiency frontier, the most efficient 
bank is on its frontier and the most 
inefficient – outside.  
A bank is inefficient if its costs exceed those 
of the most efficient bank using the same 
input-output combination 
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Supporters 
Rangan 1990; Weyman-Jones 1992; Berger 
1993; Berger and Humphrey 1997; Bauer 
1998. 
Berger and Humphrey 1997; Berger and 
Hannan 1998; Williams and Gardener 2000; 
Altunbas 2001. 
Advantages 
   Can very over time and all outputs and 
inputs are handled simultaneously which 
produces true frontier of efficiency 
   Allows a more breakdown of the 
constituents of X-efficiency, namely 
technical inefficiency which arises from 
factor inputs being over-used and allocative 
inefficiency due to lax management or 
expense behaviour.   
Disadvantages 
   Random errors from measurement 
problems: inaccurate data, random effects 
on outputs or inputs, specification errors, 




Thus, thanks to this table we can discover the methodology of parametric and non-parametric approaches 
of testing X-efficiency in banking and its formulas can help us to understand the following models of 
competition in banking sector.  
III. EMPIRICAL MODELS OF COMPETITION IN BANKING 
Empirical models of competition in banking are used to assess how competitive the banking sector is and 
help to identify factors influencing competitive structure. This empirical research can be subdivided into 
(Heffernan, 2005, pp.494-514; Bikker, 2005, pp.105-109; Bikker, 2007, pp.4-12, Degryse and Ongena, 2004, 
pp.5-22): 
 
Bank as a traditional industrial organization: 
 1) Structure-Conduct-Performance Model (Bain 1956; Berger and Hannan 1989, 2004; Altunbas and 
Gardener 1997; Punt and Rooij 2003), according to which a change in the market structure (the number of banks, 
their level of concentration, the opportunities for market entry) affects the way banks behave (mutual pricing 
agreements) and perform (monopoly rents then lead to excessive profitability). The more concentrated the 
market, the more market power banks have which means they can be inefficient without being forced out of the 
market. This approach assumes a link  between: 
Structure → Conduct (higher prices) → Performance (higher profits), 
where Structure of the marker – determined by the interaction of cost (supply) and demand; Conduct – a 
function of the numbers of sellers and buyers, barriers to entry and the cost structure (pricing decision factors): 
loan and deposit rates, bank service charges; Performance – the bank’s conduct (its pricing behaviour) will affect 
performance often measured by profitability: return on assets (net income divided into total assets), return on 
capital (net income divided into capital), return on equity (net income divided into stockholder’s equity). 
 Such model has the following overview:  
),,,,( CDMSCONCfP   (5), 
where P – performance, CONC – marker structure (market concentration), MS – market share (more 
efficient banks should have bigger market share), D – demand on the market, C – variables which reflect cost 
difference, X – different control variables.  
Such model supports the government intervention in order to limit monopoly power and decrease market 
concentration. 
2) The Relatively Efficiency Model (Demsetz 1973; Peltzmann 1977; Berger 1995), according to which 
some banks earn supernormal profits because they are more efficient than others which is reflected in greater 
output. Such model, as the previous one, says that the more concentrated market generates greater profits but 
such profits are correlated with efficiency: 
Efficiency → Conduct (higher output and/or lower prices) → Market share → Performance (higher 
profits) 
According to this model, prices and concentration, the opposite SCP, are inversely related. Under the 
relative efficiency hypothesis, causation runs from greater efficiency, lower prices and higher 
concentration/market share. Such approach can be linked to the: A). X-efficiency hypothesis – some banks have 
superior management or production technology which makes them relatively more cost efficient with lower 
costs, they are able to offer lower prices, gain market share and earn more profit; B). Scale economies hypothesis 
– banks produce at a low unit costs, lower prices and higher profits per unit of output. 
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Such model doesn’t support the government intervention into banking but mergers and acquisitions of 
banks should be encouraged in case when it increase relative efficiency and should be prevented when it increase 
market concentration. 
3). Economies of Scale and Scope Model (Allen and Rai 1996), according to which banks produce the 
optimal output mix both in terms of size and composition: 
itititit pyfTC  ),()ln( (6), 
where TC – total costs, y – outputs, p – input prices of bank i in time t. 
However such models are being criticized because in there is one-way causality between market structure 
and performance and is not considered market behaviour and the impact of bank performance on market 
structure. New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) circumvents this problem and does not try to infer the 
degree of competition from “indirect proxies”, it aims to infer firms’ conduct directly employing a variety of 
alternative methodologies with sometimes substantially different data requirements. 
 
Bank as a new empirical industrial organization: 
1) Contestable Banking Markets Model (Panzar and Rosse 1987; Bikker and Groeneveld 2000; Bikker 
and Haaf 202; Bikker 2004), according to which a contestable market is one in which firms are vulnerable to ‘hit 
and run’ entry and exit and behave as though they are price takers. This type of entry is possible if the market is 
one where customers can switch suppliers faster than the suppliers can reprice, if incumbents and newcomers 
have access to similar technology and factor prices and there are no sunk or irrecoverable costs. Thus the players 
on such contestable market could gain an appropriate market share offering lower prices nevertheless the number 
of players on that.  
To test banking market  whether it is contestable in such model it is used the Panzar-Rosse Statistics – the 
measurement technique of market  power through  investigating the extent to which changes in factor input 
prices (labour per unit, real estate per unit, interest costs to total deposits) are reflected in equilibrium industry or 

















where MC – marginal costs, OUT – bank output, FIP -  factors prices, EXcost – other exogenous factors 











where MR – marginal revenue, EXrev – factors of bank-specific function of demand. 
























  (10), 
where AFR – the ratio of annual interest expenses to total funds, PPE – ratio of personnel expenses to 
total balance sheet, BSF – other bank-specific exogenous factors (ratio of other incomes to total assets).  
 According to this market power is measured as the level of changes of factor prices are reflected on the 
equilibrium of bank revenue Ri. Using the formula (10), The Panzar-Rosse Model tests the H-Statistics 
hypothesis (the sum of elasticities of the scaled total interest revenue of the banks with respect to their factor 











  (11). 
Perfect competition implies an H-statistic equal to one. A monopoly situation yields an H-statistic that 
can be negative or zero. Monopolistic competition yields values of H in between zero and one. 
Such model doesn’t need government intervention because banks offer their products at marginal costs 
maximizing customers’ surplus. But it has some restrictions connected with constant improving information 
technologies which shorten the period between the entry of new player and his decision to exit of the market. 
2) Generalised Linear Pricing Model (Heffernan 2002), according to which it is outputted the 
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where 
itRd  - gross deposit rate paid by bank і at time t, jtLibor  =0,1,2,3 monthly lags used on Libor, 
the London interbank offer rate, n – number of banks offering the product, t – time trend, 
iD
 - dummy variable 
for each bank і, unity for bank і. 







- loan or mortgage percentage rate changed by bank і at time t. 






itf - fee for credit cards charged by bank і at time t. 
 To test for the degree of competition in the banking market is required a benchmark for a perfectly 
competitive rate against which deposit and loan rates can be compared – the London Interbank Offered Rate, is 
the rate banks quote each other for overnight deposits and loans. It presents opportunity cost of all of a bank’s 
assets, for a bank that aims to maximize expected profit it is the basis for determining the marginal revenue for 
all assets and the marginal costs of all liabilities. It is an international rate to which all banks have access and 
therefore is representative of perfectly competitive rate. 
 3) Conjectural-Variations Model (Iwata 1974; Bresnahan 1982; Lau 1982; Shaffer 1993), according to 
which a bank when choosing its output takes into account the “reaction” of rival banks. The equilibrium 
oligopoly price is then characterized by the following first order condition: 
);,();,();,(  ZQCYQQPYQP  (15), 
where Р – market equilibrium price, );,( YQP - market inverse demand function, Q – market level 
quantity, );,( ZQC - market marginal cost, D and E - vectors of unknown parameters associated with demand 
and costs respectively, Y and Z – vectors of variables that affect demand and costs respectively,   - conjectural 












where )(P , price elasticity of demand, );,( ZQCMC  - marginal costs. 
 4) Structural Demand Models (Dick 2002), according to which consumers choose for a particular bank 





ijcijijcij Xppu   , (17), 
where consumers c and banks i populate markets j, 
ciju - consumer utility, 
d
ijp
- deposit rate paid by bank i 
in market j, s
ijp
- service charges on deposits by bank i in market, 
ijkX , - vector capturing k observed product 
characteristics for the (singular) product offered by bank i in market j, 
i - unobserved bank product 
characteristics  ,, sd  - taste parameters. 
 A consumer c chooses a bank i in market j if and only if 
crjcij uu  , for r = 0 to jI  , with 0 the outside 
good and 
jI  the number of banks in market j. 
 5) Other structural models: 
A). Sunk-Cost Models (Vives 2000, Dick 2004, 2006), according to which a bank’s market share is 
sufficiently responsive to investments in information technology (quality investments). The outcome of this 
“competition through endogenous sunk costs” is that the number of “dominant” banks in the market remains 
approximately the same and that only the number of “fringe” banks will increase in market size. 
B). Structural Models of Entry (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991, 1994; Cohen and Mazzeo 2003), according to 
which the entry decisions of potential competitors and the continuation decisions of the incumbent firms only 
occur in case these decisions are actually profitable. The entry decision hinges on the level of fixed costs, the 
nature of post-entry competition, and the (future) entry or continuation decisions of other firms. 
 Thus we have studied different models which help us to measure contestability in banking markets and 
explain the key factors of such bank competitiveness.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of prudential regulation in banking the standard paradigm of perfect competition is not 
considered appropriate for banking as the free entry and exit of banks from the market is not possible. Thus 
competition in banking has some specific features which distinguish it from the competition in other industries. 
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The measurement of output of banks services has special problems because of the intangible nature of banking. 
That is why there are two different approaches to measure bank output: the production approach (bank outputs 
are measured by the number of deposit and loan accounts or the number of transactions per account - a flow 
produced per unit of time) and the intermediation approach (bank outputs are measured by the value of loans and 
investments - a stock, showing the given amount of output at one point in time). Thereby because of the fewer 
data problems the intermediation approach is used in most bank productivity studies which introduce banks as 
rational economic agents that act based on its specific productivity and efficiency functions. In banking it is very 
important to identify special problems which arise from the equivocation in the production function of banks and 
are the reason of efficiency measurement modelling based on cost and/or profit function which could explain the 
result of banks. There are two approaches of testing X-efficiency in banking (parametric and non-parametric), its 
formulas can help to understand the following models of competition in banking sector.  
There are different models which help to measure contestability in banking markets and explain the key 
factors of such bank competitiveness. Some of them study a bank as a traditional industrial organization: 
Structure-Conduct Model, Relatively Efficiency Model and Economies of Scale and Scope Model. The 
Structure-Conduct-Performance Model sees the key factor in a change in the market structure which affects the 
way banks behave and perform. Such model supports the government intervention in order to limit monopoly 
power and decrease market concentration. The Relatively Efficiency Model sees the key factor in more efficient 
than others which is reflected in greater output. Such model doesn’t support the government intervention into 
banking but mergers and acquisitions of banks should be encouraged in case when it increase relative efficiency 
and should be prevented when it increase market concentration. The Economies of Scale and Scope Model see 
the key factor in optimal output mix both in terms of size and composition.  
However because of the one-way causality between market structure and performance such models are 
being criticized. That is why new approaches have emerged which study a bank as a New Empirical Industrial 
Organization and do not try to infer the degree of competition from “indirect proxies” employing a variety of 
alternative methodologies.  
The Contestable Banking Markets Model sees the key factor of bank competitiveness in a contestable 
market where players could gain an appropriate market share offering lower prices nevertheless the number of 
players on that. To test it such model offer the Panzar-Rosse Statistics – the measurement technique of market  
power through  investigating the extent to which changes in factor input prices are reflected in equilibrium 
industry or bank-specific revenues. Such model doesn’t need government intervention because banks offer their 
products at marginal costs maximizing customers’ surplus. But it has some restrictions connected with constant 
improving information technologies which shorten the period between the entry of new player and his decision 
to exit of the market. 
The Generalised Linear Pricing Model tests for the degree of competition in the banking market through a 
benchmark for a perfectly competitive rate (Libor Index - the rate banks quote each other for overnight deposits 
and loans) against which deposit and loan rates can be compared. The Conjectural-Variations Model sees the key 
factor of bank competitiveness in choosing its output takes into account the “reaction” of rival banks. The 
Structural Demand Models – in prices and bank characteristics which are reflected in consumer’s utility 
function. The Sunk-Cost Models - in investments in information technology (quality investments). The 
Structural Models of Entry – in profitable entry decisions of potential competitors and the continuation decisions 
of the incumbent firms only occur in case these decisions are actually profitable. 
According to this we can define bank competitiveness as the possibility of bank to do its business 
efficient in order to gain profitable realization of its products in a competitive market.  
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